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DEVELOPMENT AND TAX POLICY: CASE STUDY OF 
CHINA 
Jinyan Li* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Broadly understood, the concept of development has three dimensions: 
economic, social and legal. Over the past three decades, China has 
experienced remarkable economic development and less social and legal 
development.  The gross domestic product (GDP) grew from CNY362,410 
million in 1978 to CNY 13,687,590 million in 2004.1  In 2005, China was 
the world’s fourth largest economy measured by the size of the GDP, the 
third largest trader, and one of the largest recipients of foreign direct 
investment.2 The average wage increased from CNY762 in 1980 to 
CNY14,040 in 2003.3 China has been successful in reducing poverty and 
improving some social indicators.4 But, income disparities have been 
rising rapidly in China. The Gini coefficient, a widely used measure for 
                                                 
* Professor of Law. Osgoode Hall Law School. York University, Toronto. The Author 
thanks Richard Bird, Neil Brooks, Rick Krever and Yoram Margalioth, as well as the 
participants at 1st INTR Conference on Taxation and Development (3-5 November 2006) 
and the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, The James Hausman Tax Law & Policy 
Workshop series, March 2007 for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. She 
also thanks He Huang, an LL.M candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School, for her research 
assistance. 
1 China Statistical Year Book (2005). http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/indexch.htm. 
2 For a detailed discussion of FDI flows, see World Investment Report , 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1485&lang=1   
3 National Bureau of Statistics, Beijing, China. www.stats.gov.cn. 
4 See World Bank. 2005. China Leading Group on Poverty Alleviation and Development 
CDD Project. http://siteresources.worldbank.org; and UN Country Team China 
Occasional Paper, “Advancing Social Development in China: Contribution to the 11th 
Five-Year Plan. 
http://www.unchina.org/115plan/ENGLISH.pdf#search=%22social%20development%20
China%22. 
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inequality, rose from 0.25 in 1980 to an estimated 0.45 in 2005.5 In the 
early 1990s, the top 10% of the population held 40% of savings in China. 
By 2005, the top 5% of the population own about 50% of the national 
savings.6 The Chinese legal system has been transformed from an 
ideology-based system to a regime that is more accommodating to the 
market.7 And yet, China does not have the rule of law.8  
Tax policy has been an important instrument for the Chinese government. 
As in other countries, the government not only relies on taxation as its 
main source of revenue, but also a “leverage” in “regulating” economic 
and social activities. The role of tax policy in China’s development is 
perhaps “unique” because China’s experiment with development is unique 
in many ways. It is a socialist country governed by the Communist Party. 
The Chinese leadership has resisted the advice of international experts to 
go for big bang economic reforms in favour of a more gradual, pragmatic 
                                                 
5 Bert Hoffman. 2006. Access to Opportunity Eases Income Inequality. China Daily 
(2006-01-20).  http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/chinagate/doc/2006-
01/20/content_514069.htm); and Shenggan Fan and Connie Chan-Kang. 2005. Road 
Development, Economic Growth, and Poverty Reduction in China (Research Report 138, 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington D.C.) at 5. 
6 Editorial, 2007. China’s Income Disparity Grows. People’s Daily Online 
(http://english.people.com.cn/english/200007/12/eng20000712_45330.html). 
7 China’s legal system ranked in the 51st percentile on the World Bank’s rule of law index 
in 2002, having risen from the 32nd percentile in 1996. The index is part of the World 
Bank's Report:  Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996–2005: 
http://web.worldbank.org. This index measures the extent to which people have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, how fair and predictable the rules are, and 
how well property rights are protected. The indicators include perceptions of incidence of 
crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of 
contracts.   
8 For a more extensive treatment of legal reforms in China, see Randall Peerenboom. 
2002. China’s Long March toward Rule of Law. New York: Cambridge University Press 
(discussing the differences between thin (procedural) and thick (substantive) theories of 
rule of law: 65-71). See also Stanley B. Lubman. 1999. Bird in A Cage – Legal Reform 
in China after Mao. Stanford. (Calif.: Stanford University Press); and 2006. Looking for 
Law in China. 20 Columbia J. of Asian L. 1-92.  
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approach.9 The economy is still in transition from a centrally-planned 
economy towards a socialist market economy; it is highly fragmented and 
unevenly developed across the country. Economic development has 
preceded social development. There are many “pressure points” in 
Chinese society that, if not managed well, could potentially derail the train 
of economic reform. China has experienced remarkable economic growth 
apparently without the benefit of the “rule of law”,10 which may present a 
problem for the law and development movement.11 The Chinese legal 
system features many “transplants” from other legal systems while 
retaining strong “Chinese characteristics”. One area of such transplants is 
the income tax law applicable to foreign investors in China. 
This paper examines the role of tax policy in China’s development.  
Following the introduction, Part II outlines the current Chinese tax system 
and major episodes of tax reforms. It describes the current tax structure, 
context for tax reforms and tax policy objectives in order to provide the 
necessary background.12 Parts III to IV discuss the role of tax policy in 
China’s economic development, social development, and legal 
                                                 
9 Randall Peerenboom. 2006. What Have We Learned About Law And Development? 
Describing, Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China. 27 Mich. J. Int'l L. 823; 
Peerenboom, ibid, at 197. 
10 For a classic account of this movement see David Trubek and Marc Galanter. 1974. 
Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development 
Studies in the United States. (4) Wisonsin L. Rev, 1062-1102. For recent literature on law 
and development, see Antony Anghie. 2000. Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, 
International Financial Institutions, and the Third World. (32) N.Y.U. J. Int’ L & Pol. 
243; Anthony Carty. 1992. Law and Economic Development. New York, N.Y.: New 
York University Press; Ronald J. Daniels and Michael Trebilcock. 2004. The Political 
Economy of Rule of Law Reform in Developing Countries. (26) Mich. J. Int’l L. 99, at 
102; and Kerry Rittich, 2004. The Future Of Law And Development: Second Generation 
Reforms And The Incorporation Of The Social. 26 Mich. J. Int'l L. 199 (this article has 
been included in David Trubek and Alvaro Santos, eds. 2006. The New Law and 
Economic Development (Cambridge UP).  
11 See also Randall Peerenboom. 2006. “Is China a Problem Case? (603) Annals 192, at 
192. 
12 Alec Easson and Jinyan Li. 1989. Taxation of Foreign Investment in the People’s 
Republic of China. De Hague. The Netherlands, Kluwer. 
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development. The paper concludes with some general themes arising from 
the discussions.    
II. CHINESE TAX SYSTEM AND POLICY: AN 
OVERVIEW 
The Chinese tax system13 “looks” like other tax systems. It consists of 
income taxes, consumption taxes, property taxes and miscellaneous taxes. 
The functions of taxation are to raise revenue, to stimulate economic 
growth, and to facilitate social and political stability. The current system is 
the result of major reforms during the last three decades.  
A. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION 
Soon after the Communist Party formed government in 1949 China 
initiated a socialist reconstruction of the economy. Private capital was 
“nationalized” and foreign investment gradually left China. Some turnover 
taxes and some property taxes were introduced and administered by the 
general tax bureau. The reconstruction was more or less complete in 1956. 
From 1956 to 1978, a strict Soviet-type command economy was practised 
and the private sector almost vanished. Industry and commerce were 
completely controlled by publicly owned enterprises. State-owned 
enterprises delivered all their profits to the government and turnover taxes 
were generally used to facilitate the transfer of funds from enterprises to 
the government's coffer. At the peak of the political and economic turmoil 
during the Cultural Revolution (1965-76), law and order was in disarray, 
the role of taxation was disregarded, and the tax department existed only 
in name. 
                                                 
13 For an overview of Chinese tax system, see Easson and Li, ibid.; Donald J.S. Brean, 
ed., Taxation in Modern China. 1998. New York and London, Ruthledge; and Jinyan Li. 
1991. Taxation in the People’s Republic of China. New York. Praeger. For some 
historical account of the system, see George N. Ecklund. 1963. Taxation in Communist 
China (1950-59).Ann Arbor, Michigan. University Microfilms, Inc. 
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In 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the Communist Party 
changed its policy from political struggle to economic development.14 
Deng made it clear that the need for economic development prevailed over 
the concern about the pursuit of the Party’s  socialist ideals. “It doesn't 
matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice.”15  The 
economic reforms thus changed the relationship between the state and the 
market, allowing room for tax policy design.   
The new economic policy had two parts: opening up China to foreign 
investment and reforming the domestic economic system. Establishing a 
modern tax system was considered critical to the success of the policy. To 
facilitate the transition, a two-track tax system was introduced so that a 
Western style tax system would apply to foreign-invested firms and 
individuals and another system would apply to Chinese firms and citizens: 
• The “foreign” track was created first: the Individual Income Tax 
(targeted at foreign individuals) (1980), the Equity Joint Ventures 
Income Tax (1980) and the Foreign Enterprise Income Tax (1981) 
(applicable to co-operative joint ventures, wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises and other foreign entities doing business in China). A 
multi-stage, cumulative turnover tax –Consolidated Industrial and 
Commercial Tax (1958) – was revived because it was the only “tax 
law” in existence.16  
• The “domestic” track was created in 1983 and 1984: state 
enterprises became subject to taxes -- a reform which is commonly 
referred to in Chinese as li gai shui (taxation replacing profit 
delivery); separate taxes applied to the emerging collective 
enterprises and private enterprises; turnover taxes applicable to 
                                                 
14 Sheying Chen. 2002. Economic Reform and Social Change in China: Past, Present, and 
Future of the Economic State.  (15) No.4 Int’l J. of Politics and Society 569-89, at 572. 
15  CNN.  Reformer with an iron fist: Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997). 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/china.50/inside.china/profiles/deng.xiaoping/.  
16 As explained under Part V below, “law” is a statute enacted by the legislation. China 
deemed it important to subject foreign investors to tax “laws”, not just “interim 
regulations” or “administrative rules”. 
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domestic enterprise were introduced; and numerous miscellaneous 
taxes on property and transactions were reintroduced.   
The years following 1986 saw the rationalization, consolidation, and 
reform of existing taxes. In 1991, the foreign track became consolidated: 
the Equity Joint Ventures Income Tax was merged with the Foreign 
Enterprise Income Tax to become the Enterprise Income Tax on Foreign 
Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises (the “FIE Tax”). In 1994, 
the three domestic enterprise income taxes were replaced by a 
consolidated domestic Enterprise Income Tax. The foreign track merged 
with the domestic track in the area of turnover taxes and individual income 
tax. The 1994 reform also resulted in a new central-local tax assignment 
between the central and local government as well as a new system of tax 
administration. A new uniform Enterprise Income Tax Law was 
promulgated in on March 16, 2007 to replace the existing FIE Tax and 
domestic enterprise income tax.17  
The evolution of the tax system generally tracks the development of the 
market conditions in China. When the market was just emerging in the 
1980s, the government retained tight control over domestic enterprises and 
used tax policy to “regulate” these enterprises. In the 1990s, improving 
market conditions required more “neutral” tax policies and triggered the 
consolidation of taxes in 1994. China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization in 2001 and further economic reforms led to further 
deregulation of the economy. The Uniform Enterprise Income Tax 
symbolizes the ending of official “tax discrimination” against domestic 
enterprises and the government’s confidence in “free competition” 
between domestic and foreign investors. 
                                                 
17 Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, promulgated by the 5th 
Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress, March 16, 2007. This law replaces the 
two existing enterprise income taxes as of January 1, 2008. 
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B. CURRENT TAX STRUCTURE  
1. CONSUMPTION TAXES  
The Chinese terminology for consumption taxes are “turnover taxes” (liu 
zhuan shui), because, other than the VAT, tax is imposed on gross 
turnover. These taxes include the Value-added Tax (VAT), Business Tax, 
Consumption Tax, and Resources Tax. They generate more than two-
thirds of total tax revenue.18  
The VAT is the most productive source of revenue – more than 37% of 
total tax revenue in 2004.19 This tax applies to the sale of goods and 
selected services. The standard rate is 17%. A lower rate of 13% rate 
applies to necessities, certain culture products, agricultural supplies, and 
other goods as stipulated by the State Council.  Exports are zero-rated.  
“Small suppliers" are taxed at 6 percent. One key feature of the Chinese 
VAT that distinguishes it from many other VAT systems is the scope of 
input credit. The Chinese VAT allows no input credit for the cost of fixed 
assets, such as computers, machinery and equipment, thereby resulting in 
cascading taxation on capital expenditures.   
The Business Tax, which applies to gross turnover, is imposed on business 
activities that are not subject to the VAT – mostly services. The tax rate is 
3% for transportation, construction, postal communication, cultural and 
athletic activities; 5% for banking, insurance, services, and the transfer of 
intangible property and immovable property; and 5% to 20% for 
entertainment (the applicable rate is determined by the local government).    
The Consumption Tax, which also applies to gross turnover, is an excise 
imposed on the sale and importation of luxury goods, such as tobacco, 
liquor, cosmetics, fireworks and firecrackers, gasoline, diesel, tires, 
motorcycles and automobiles. The tax rates range from 3% on non-luxury 
cars to 45% on top-quality cigarettes. This tax is imposed in addition to 
the VAT. 
                                                 
18 China Statistics Yearbook 2005. Source: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/html/H0803e.htm. 
19  Ibid.  
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The Resource Tax is a turnover tax imposed on the production and sale of 
crude oil, natural gas, coal, non-ferrous metals, ferrous metals, and salt in 
China. The amount of tax payable is determined by the Ministry of 
Finance according to the mining or production conditions of the taxpayer.  
2. INCOME TAXES   
Income taxes are the second major source of revenue, generating about 22 
percent of total tax revenue.20 Income taxes have been growing faster than 
consumption taxes.21 The dual-track system has been an important feature 
in enterprise income taxation.   
Overall, the foreign track, or the FIE Tax, is more “western” as it 
addresses international issues and China wanted to follow the international 
tax norm. The domestic track has more features from the command 
economy and is much less detailed than the FIE Tax. For example, the FIE 
legislation contains over 19,418 words, the domestic enterprise income tax 
legislation contains only 9251 words. With respect to deductible expenses, 
FIEs may deduct the cost of wages, salaries and employee benefits 
whereas domestic enterprises can deduct only the amount of wages in 
accordance with the standard set by the government. The most notable 
difference lies in the tax preferences:  tax preference provisions account 
for 1/20 of the provisions in the domestic legislation, and 1/5 provisions of 
the FIE Tax Law.  
The Individual Income Tax is a schedular tax. Income from employment is 
taxed monthly at progressive rates ranging from 5% to 45% (CNY100,000 
or US$11,494). Income from the business of industrial and commercial 
activities  and enterprise leasing and management  are taxable annually at 
progressive rates ranging from 5% to 35%.  Income from personal services 
                                                 
20 Ibid.  
21 From 2000-2005, the overall growth rate is 20.1. The growth rate is 18% for VAT, 
17.6% for Business Tax, 13.6% for Consumption Tax, 24.7% for Domestic Enterprise 
Income Tax,  28.6% for FIE Tax, and 90% for Individual Income Tax. See Source: China 
Statistics Yearbook, 2000 (for data related to 1994-99); State Administration of Taxation, 
“Growth of Each Taxes”, 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/view.jsp?code=200603091136179494 (visited on April 14, 
2006) (for data related to 2000-2005). 
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is subject to a 20% flat rate tax.22 Investment income, incidental income, 
and capital gains are taxed at a flat rate of 20%.  In computing the taxable 
amount, a deduction for actual expenses is allowed only in the case of 
business income. A standard deduction is allowed in the case of 
employment income, income from services, rents and royalties. Interest, 
dividends, and incidental income are taxed on a gross basis.  Tax is 
withheld at source in all cases other than business income. 
3. PROPERTY AND OTHER TAXES 
There is a large number of taxes on property, transactions, and other 
activities, generating about 8% of total tax revenue.23 Taxes on real estate 
are the most significant. A real estate gains tax was introduced in 1993 to 
regulate the growing real estate market in China.  It applies to gains from 
the transfer of land-use rights, buildings (other than residential housing) 
and other structures affixed to land at progressive rates ranging from 30% 
to 60%.  The urban real estate tax is imposed on the owners of real estate 
in urban areas.  The Deed Tax is levied on the transfer of land-use rights, 
the sale, gift or exchange of houses and buildings.   
The Stamp Tax applies to the signing or issue of commercial contracts and 
documents. For example, loan contracts are taxed at 0.005% of the loan 
amount, and technology contracts are taxed at 0.03% of the contractual 
price. Taxpayers pay the tax by purchasing and affixing tax stamps.  
C. CENTRAL AND LOCAL FISCAL RELATIONSHIP 
China’s political system is unitary. The financial system is highly 
decentralized as expenditures by local governments account for 71% of 
                                                 
22 A surtax is applicable when a particular payment is “abnormally high” (i.e., exceeding 
CNY20,000). The surtax is imposed at the following rates: 10% on an amount between 
CNY20,000 and CNY50,000; 20% on an amount exceeding CNY50,000. Therefore, the 
combined tax rate is 30% on taxable amount exceeding  CNY20,000 (up to CNY50,000) 
and  40% on taxable amount exceeding CNY50,000. 
23 SAT, http://www.chinatax.gov.cn. 
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government expenditures.24 This creates enormous challenges to Chinese 
tax policy.25 The Central Government has exclusive taxing powers in 
terms of legislation. All taxes are introduced by the Central Government. 
However, revenue from specific taxes is assigned to local government.   
Under the current revenue-sharing system, local governments are entitled 
to the revenue from the following taxes: 100% of property and transaction 
taxes,26 25% of VAT, Business Tax (with minor exceptions), domestic 
enterprise income tax (other than those paid by centrally-owned 
enterprises, local banks, financial institutions, and railway, banking and 
insurance companies that pay income tax centrally through their head 
office); FIE Tax (other than those paid by foreign banks); and Resource 
tax (other than those paid by offshore oil companies).  
In general, sub-national governments receive about 50% of total tax 
revenue.27 There is thus a structural shortage in local revenue, which has 
serious implications for development.  
D. GOALS OF TAX POLICY DESIGN 
In China, a paramount goal for tax policy design is to raise adequate 
revenue for the government to finance its ambitious reform programs. A 
subsidiary goal is to regulate private activities to facilitate the economic 
                                                 
24 Source: Ministry of Finance: 
http://www.mof.gov.cn/news/uploadfile/zhongyang001.xls; 
http://www.mof.gov.cn/news/uploadfile/zhongyang0009.xls. 
25 Bahl, Roy W.  1999.  Fiscal Policy in China. Taxation and Inter-governmental Fiscal 
Relations (South San Francisco: University of Michigan Press); Bahl, R.W. and Jorge 
Martinez-Vazquez. 2003. “Fiscal Federalism and Economic Reform in China”, paper 
prepared for Fiscal Federalism in a Global Environment (Center for Research on 
Economic Development and Policy Reform, Stanford University.); Richard Bird and 
Duanjie Chen. 1998. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in China in International 
Perspective. in Donald J.S. Brean, ed., Taxation in Modern China (London and New 
York: Routledge), at 151-85.   
26 However, sub-national governments can get only 2% of Stamp Duties imposed on 
stock transactions.   
27 Local governments rely on fiscal transfers for additional revenue. 
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transition. As discussed below, China has also been conscientious about 
using tax reforms to promote social stability and the idea of rule-by-law.   
1. REVENUE  
Reforms cost money. Fundamental reforms cost a great deal of money. 
Securing adequate revenue has been one of the most important concern in 
Chinese tax policy. During the past three decades, taxation has become a 
main source of government revenue. In recent years, tax revenues have 
been rising relative to GDP and in absolute terms. The tax/GDP ratio was 
18.6% in 2003 and 12.6% in 1993.28 The amount of tax revenue in 2003 
was 5.4 times of that in 1993.29  
The current tax structure has been designed to generate maximum 
revenue.30 Most taxes in China are collected by the use of consumption 
taxes. Compared to income taxes, consumption taxes are easier to 
administer. These taxes are collected from enterprises, not consumers, 
thereby reducing the cost of administration and compliance. Turnover 
taxes had existed prior to economic reforms and Chinese enterprises were 
used to them. Even though the VAT was a new type of tax and the 
invoice-control system was more complex, VAT accounting and 
management are simpler than income taxes.31  The second major type of 
                                                 
28 This ratio is much lower than that in OECD countries. See OECD (2002) China in the 
World Economy: The Domestic Policy Challenges (Paris, 2002). 
29 See Ministry of Finance, http://www.mof.gov.cn/news/uploadfile/guojia020.xls . 
30 In terms of growth, however, consumption-based taxes lag behind income taxation. 
Since 2000, the ratio has dropped to 68 percent when enterprise income taxes grew from 
13.9% of total tax revenue in 1994 to 16.4% in 2004, and Individual Income Tax grew 
from less than 1 percent to 6 percent in 2004.With the maturity of the Chinese tax system, 
the share of income taxation in the tax structure is expected to increase even further.  See 
Zhou, Quanlin and Wang Qiao. 2006. A Rational and Equitable Analysis of Chinese 
Government’s Tax Collection Scope. No.1, Taxation Research J. 32-36 at 33 (in 
Chinese).    
31 Under the current circumstances, reliance on businesses for tax collection is arguably 
more efficient than relying on individuals. However, improving the transparency in tax 
policy making and in the relationship between tax payment and provision of public goods 
will certainly help improve the overall efficiency in tax collection. 
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tax is income tax on business entities. Again, this tax is relatively easier to 
collect than individual income taxes. 
2. TAX INCENTIVES  
China has used tax incentives extensively. In tax jargons, these tax 
incentives are referred to as “tax expenditures.” Tax expenditures are, in 
essence, the spending of money by the government by way of foregoing 
the taxes owed under the normal rules of tax law. They are the economic 
equivalence of the government receiving the taxes owed and then 
subsidizing the activity through a grant.  
Every major tax law contains tax expenditure provisions.32  For example, 
the VAT exempts contraceptive medicines from tax. Business Tax 
exempts child care, education and medical services. The Individual 
Income Tax exempts a large variety of amounts from tax. They include 
awards from the government, settlement fees to military personnel, salary 
of foreign experts sent to work in China international organizations. The 
Foreign-investment Enterprise Income Tax provides a wide range of 
preferences to new enterprises, FIEs operating in special areas,33 FIEs 
exporting more than 70% of their products each year, and high-tech 
FIEs.34 The standard 20% withholding tax on dividends, interest, rents and 
                                                 
32 Shi Yaobin, 2004. Establishing a Tax Expenditure Administrative System That 
Achieves a Sound Fiscal System in China. in Hana Polackova Brixi, Christian M.A. 
Valenduc. And Zhicheng. L. Swifft, eds. 2004. Tax Expenditures—Shedding Light on 
Government Spending through the Tax System: Lessons from Developed and Transition 
Economies (Washington D.C. The World Bank) 173-189, at 177. There is no shortage of 
Chinese literature on tax expenditures, such as Tax Research Institute. 1992. Theory and 
Practice of Tax Expenditures; Lou Jiwei. 2003. Theoretical Innovations and Systematic 
Explorations in Tax Expenditure. Most of the literature is descriptive and some normative 
and critical of the current tax policies. 
33 Special economic zones, Open Coastal Economic Zones, the Economic and 
Technological Development Zones, Shanghai Pudong New Area, industrial parks, 
bonded zones, and the Western Region. For a more detailed discussion of these 
preferences, see Jiang, Zhaodong. 1999. China's Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment: 
Policy, Culture and Modern Concepts. 18 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 549 at 601. 
34 In addition, the non-resident withholding tax on dividends, interest, rentals, royalties is 
either waived or reduced. For example, dividends paid by foreign-invested enterprises are 
currently exempt from withholding tax.  Withholding tax is waived in the case of interest 
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royalties may be waived or reduced, upon the approval of the tax 
administration.  
Using tax expenditures as policy instruments is consistent with China’s 
previous practice of “central planning”, the autocratic style of governance, 
the need to accommodate local economic conditions of different regions of 
the country, and the desire to compete with other developing countries in 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).35 For example, international 
competitiveness has always been a key concern in Chinese tax policy. 
Although the nominal enterprise income tax rate is 33%,36 the effective 
rate for FIEs is set at about 10 to 15 percent as a result of the tax 
expenditures. This is to ensure that the Chinese tax rate was close to the 
rate in Hong Kong, which has been the main source of FDI. Because Hong 
Kong does not tax foreign source business profits and Mainland China is a 
“foreign” jurisdiction,37 Chinese tax determines the total tax liability of 
Hong Kong investors. For investors from other countries, Chinese tax 
treaties generally contain a tax sparing credit to preserve the economic 
benefit of Chinese tax preferences to the investor.38   
                                                                                                                         
on  loans extended to the Chinese Government or China's state banks by international 
financial organizations, interest on loans to China's state banks with preferential interest 
rates.  Royalty withholding tax rate is reduced from the standard 20 percent to 10% or 0 if 
the technology is "advanced" and offered on "preferential" terms, and the technology is 
related to scientific research, the development of energy resources, transportation, 
communications, and production in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishing.   
35 There is a strong sense expressed in the Chinese literature that well-designed tax 
incentives are important to economic development. While virtually every issue of 
International Tax Journal of China, Taxation Research, and China Taxation publishes 
articles on tax incentives, the author has not come across a single piece arguing that tax 
incentives are not useful to economic development.  
36 In order to maintain competitiveness, the nominal tax rate is set at 33% for enterprise 
income tax, which was comparable to the rates in China’s neighbouring countries in the 
early 1980s. 
37 Jinyan Li. 2003. International Taxation in the Age of Electronic Commerce: A 
Comparative Study (Toronto, Canadian Tax Foundation) ch.6. 
38 China’s treaty policy also promotes the competitiveness of the Chinese tax system. 
Many of China’s tax treaties waive or reduce source withholding taxes on investment 
income to top up the already generous domestic tax preferences. As a result, not only 
Chinese tax is low not only for FDI but also foreign passive investment. 
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On the other hand, however, the extensive use of tax expenditures 
contradicts with the main goal of tax policy – generating revenue. Tax 
expenditures have a huge revenue cost.  In the absence of any official 
estimate,39 an unofficial estimate put the figure at CNY50 billion per year, 
or up to 10% of local tax revenue in certain places.40 A more aggressive 
estimate put the amount of revenue loss equal to the amount of revenue 
collected:41 
In terms of scale, the cost of current tax expenditures has 
reached—and even exceeded—the amount of total tax revenue 
collected by the benchmark system. For example, the cost of 
tax expenditures within the commodity tax nearly equals 
commodity tax revenue. Moreover, the cost of income tax 
expenditures exceeds the amount of income tax revenue.  
This estimate presumably includes revenue loss resulted directly from the 
foregone taxes as well as losses resulted indirectly from misuse and abuse 
of tax expenditures and increased cost of administration and compliance.42 
                                                 
39 The Ministry of Finance is in the process of establishing a team of experts to study the 
issue of tax expenditures and develop models for assessments.   
40 Lu, Jiansuo. 1999. A Brief Discussion on the Sources of and Preventive Measures for 
Tax Revenue Loss. No. 9 Tax Research Journal 61-64 (in Chinese). 
41 Ma Quoqiang. 2004. China’s Current Tax Expenditure System: Issues and Policy 
Options. in Brixi et al., supra note 32, 190-202 at 197. Chinese scholars have increasingly 
argued that the tax incentive regimes in China are generous to a fault. See for example, 
Chen Chun. 2005. Thoughts on China’s Foreign Tax Incentives.  (no.7) Int’l Taxation in 
China 31-33; Li Zhiyuan. 2006. Building A Tax Expenditure System Suitable for China,   
No.3, Taxation Research J. 40-42; Tang Zhiqiang. 2005. Defects and Adjustments of 
Foreign Tax Incentives. no.10, Int’l Taxation in China 26-27; and Ye Jun. 2005. 
Discussion of the Need to Keep or Abolish Foreign Tax Incentives.  no.11, Int’l Taxation 
in China 28-29. 
42 See, for example, Li, Zhiyuan. 2006. Building A Tax Expenditure System Suitable for 
China. No.3 Taxation Research 40-42; Li, Tingxu. 1999. Means of Tax Avoidance and 
Tax Evasion by Foreign Investment Enterprises and Prevention Measures. No.8 
,International Tax Journal of China 62-64; Tie Wei. 1999. Causes and Assessment of Tax 
Avoidance under Current Tax System.  No.11 Int’l Taxation in China 32-34; Zhang, 
Yiming and Zhang Xiaoting. 2005. Issues of VAT Type-Conversion. No.8 Tax Research 
Journal 22-23 (discussing how enterprises in the North-East region take advantages of the 
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3. REGULATORY INSTRUMENT 
In addition to providing economic stimulations through tax incentives, tax 
policy plays a strong regulatory role in China. Some of the taxes used to 
be called “regulatory taxes” or “adjustment taxes” as they were introduced 
for the main purpose of regulating private activities. For example, the 
Regulatory Tax on Fixed Assets Investments was introduced in 1991 “to 
implement state industry policy, to control the scale of investment, to 
guide the direction of investment, to adjust the structure of investment, to 
strengthen construction of major projects, and promote sustainable, stable, 
coordinated economic growth”.43 Tax rates range from nil to 30% (e.g., 
detached residential houses or cottages built with public funds).  
Real estate taxes and stamp duty are often used to “cool down” the over-
heated real estate or stock market by raising tax rates. For example, when 
the government tripled the stamp duty on securities transactions late in the 
evening on May 30, 2007, it sent the stock markets into a tailspin that saw 
the benchmark Shanghai Composite Index drop roughly 20% through 
midday Tuesday before it turned upward again.44   
 
III. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
This part discussive assessment of the relationship between tax policy and 
China’s economic development. More specifically, it focuses on tax policy 
in respect of enterprise income taxation and foreign direct investment. It 
notes the extent to which tax policy was driven by developmental features 
of the Chinese economy, i.e., transitional, favoring foreign direct 
                                                                                                                         
new VAT credit for capital expenditures); and Ye, Jun. 2005. To Repeal or Not to Repeal 
of Foreign Tax Incentive Policies. No.11 International Tax Journal of China 28-29 (all in 
Chinese). 
43 Regulations on the Regulatory Tax on Fixed Assets Investment, State Council 
Directive, [1991] No.82, article 1. 
44 Shu-Ching Jean Chen. 2007. Beijing Denies Capital Gains Tax In The Works. 
http://www.forbes.com/markets/2007/06/07/china-capital-gains-markets-econ-
cx_jc_0607markets1.html (visited June 8, 2007). 
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investment, and regional disparities. It draws some preliminary 
conclusions about the negative impact of certain tax policies on economic 
development. Overall, the relationship is dynamic and mutually reactive.    
A. TAX POLICY IN A TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY 
Generally speaking, tax policy has a direct impact on economic 
development by either leaving the market alone or interfering with it. In 
tax jargons, these are the policy of tax neutrality and the policy of tax 
expenditures. These policies ostensibly contradict each other, although 
both could be defended on the ground of economic development.  
The principle of tax neutrality requires a tax system be “designed to bring 
about a minimum change in the allocation of resources within the private 
sector of the economy.”45 The reason underlying this principle is that “at 
least in the present state of knowledge, the allocation of resources in 
response to free market forces will in general give in the short run the best 
utilisation of resources, and in the long run the most satisfactory rate of 
increase in the output of the economy.”46 In a neutral tax system, people's 
work practices and business and investment decisions would be no 
different than they would have been in a world without taxes. To the 
extent that behaviour is influenced by the tax system, there is a tax-
induced change in the allocation of society's resources; that is the effect of 
a tax system that is not neutral.  
Despite all the arguments in favour of neutrality, the government of most 
countries use tax policy to pursue various social and economic policies, 
often using deductions from income or credits against tax as the means of 
providing the desired incentive.   
As mentioned already, the Chinese tax system is full of tax incentives. The 
typical justifications for tax expenditures include: market failures, positive 
externalities of certain activities, and efficiency in delivering social 
programs through tax subsidies as opposed to direct spending programs. 
They can all be invoked in China. The fact that the Chinese economy has 
                                                 
45 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Carter Report) (1966), vol. 2, 8. 
46 Ibid. 
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been undergoing a transition from a centrally-planned model to a market 
model makes a prima facie case for tax expenditures on ground of market 
failures. Attracting foreign direct investment through tax incentives is 
justified because such investment generates a large number of benefits to 
China, such as job creation, capital market developments, management 
skills, and exports of China-made products.  However, the development of 
the market economy has demanded, and to some extent, been facilitated 
by, a neutrality-oriented tax policy. From a historical perspective, tax 
neutrality has gained ground over tax expenditures. Since China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, tax neutrality 
has become a main objective of tax reform. As such, the relationship 
between tax policy and economic development in China is relative to the 
stage of economic transition.  
 
B. DUAL-TRACK TAX SYSTEM AND ECONOMIC REFORMS  
Until the 1994 tax reform, the Chinese tax policy was designed to be 
differential in order to stimulate certain economic activities under 
“imperfect” market conditions. As such, tax policy played a positive role 
in facilitating the economic transition.  
One differential tax policy is the dual-track enterprise income tax system: 
foreign enterprises and foreign-invested Chinese enterprises were taxed 
under one regime, whereas pure domestically-owned enterprises were 
taxed under a different regime. Overall, the foreign-track allowed more tax 
incentives, lower tax burdens. This policy seemed to have contributed 
positively to the success of economic reforms at earlier stages. The 
domestic track was considered highly successful in complementing the 
structural reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A main goal in 
internal economic reforms was to restructure SOEs to become 
economically efficient entities. Replacing the previous profit-delivery 
mechanisms under the command economy with tax payments helped 
SOEs and their government regulators to recognize the new relationship 
between the enterprises and the government.  It also provided economic 
incentives for SOEs to be more profitable as they can keep the after-tax 
profits. The tax system brought some “objective” assessment of the 
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performances of SOEs.47 Another goal in internal economic reforms was 
to gradually allow the development of the private sector, which was 
previously viewed suspiciously in ideological terms.48 By taxing the 
profits of private enterprises the government legitimized the private sector.   
The foreign track of the tax system was deemed necessary in order to 
create a more enticing environment for foreign investors. During the early 
periods of economic reforms, there were significant market failures and 
the internal tax policy had strong traits of the command economy. 
Maintaining a separate tax regime for foreign investment enterprises 
(FIEs) was possible because FIEs were expected to invest in China and 
export products to the world market. Direct competition with local 
enterprises on the Chinese market was limited. FIEs were allowed in 
selected sectors of the economy, mostly manufacturing Within the 
approved sectors, FIEs were regulated more by market principles than 
government plans. China became a huge base for manufacturing and 
exports. Judging from the growth of FDI in China (growing from a total of 
USD 4,104 million from 1978-1984 to USD60,630 million in 2004 
alone),49 it is easy to see why the Chinese government believed that such 
policy goal has been met.   
However, the external and internal reforms are not wholly independent of 
each other. When the market conditions develop for domestic enterprises 
and FIEs began to face fewer regulatory hurdles to enter the Chinese 
market, competition between domestically-funded and foreign-funded 
enterprises intensified. Since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, 
China has further reduced barriers for FDI. For example, foreign firms 
have been gradually allowed to own up to 50 per cent of enterprises in 
sensitive industries, such as telecom and insurance industries. Foreign 
importers have been allowed to own domestic distribution networks, and 
foreign banks will be able to conduct local currency business with Chinese 
enterprises within two years of accession. During the past few years, 
                                                 
47 Li (1991), supra note 13. 
48 Huang, Yasheng. 1999. Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During Reform Era  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) at 331. 
49 China Statistical Year Book (2005). 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/html/R1813e.htm (in Chinese). 
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China is no longer just a manufacturing base for multinational 
corporations, but a marketplace for products and services. Apparently, 
among the sectors open to FDI, the top five enterprises in each sector have 
become controlled by foreign investors, and foreign investors control the 
majority of assets in 21 out of 28 major industrial sectors.50 
Given China’s conditions (size, uneven regional development, and 
transitional nature of the economy), China’s long-term growth must 
depend on a well-developed market for all investors. The effective tax 
burden on FIEs is about 5 per cents lower than that for SOEs.51 The two-
track tax policy has recently been considered to be unfair,52 resulting in 
inefficient allocation of resources. Chinese-owned enterprises have been 
crying for “national treatment” from their own government.53 
                                                 
50 Shi, Weigan. 2006. A Reexamination of the Role of Foreign Investors. 
http://finance.sina.com.cn (September 1, 2006) (in Chinese)  
51 Tax Policy and Legislation Department of State Administration of Taxation, ed. 2003. 
Frontier Tax Policy Study in China (Beijing, China Tax Press) (in Chinese).  
52 See, for example, Tang, Zhiqiang. 2005. Foreign Tax Preferences: Defects and 
Adjustments. No.12 Int’l Taxation in China 26-27 (in Chinese). 
53 In addition to the dual-track enterprise income taxation, some other features of Chinese 
tax structure are considered by Chinese scholars to impede economic development. One 
example is the production-type VAT which denies an input credit for capital 
expenditures. The lack of credit presumably discourages enterprises from investing in 
machinery and equipment and from becoming technology-intensive or capital-intensive 
enterprises. Because capital expenditures are not deductible, input taxes embedded in 
exported products cannot be fully refunded to the exporter, thereby discouraging exports. 
On the other hand, the export-refund system under the VAT, which is consistent with 
WTO principles, is believed to have promoted China’s export growth. China’s heavy 
reliance on VAT in its tax structure allows China to subsidize exports at a greater degree 
than a tax system that relies more on income taxation. As regulatory instruments, the 
Consumption Tax and Resources Tax are considered to have played a positive role in 
discouraging the consumption of luxury goods and the excessive use of natural resources. 
The levy of transaction-based taxes, such as Stamp Duties, Deeds Tax, and real estate 
taxes may have played a role in “cooling” down the over-heated real estate market and in 
saving China from the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. 
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C.  TAX PREFERENCES FOR FDI  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) was considered crucial to China’s 
economic development because FDI is often accompanied by the badly-
needed technology, management skills, and international market 
information.54 At the inception of the economic reforms, tax preferences 
played a positive role because of their potential signalling effect, the 
compensation effect, and the hospitality effect.55 In the late 1970s, China 
relied on tax preferences as part of its overall strategy to attract foreign 
direct investment.56 The intention was to send a clear signal to foreign 
investors China’s desire for capital from abroad. This signalling effect is 
historically important because China suffered from serious image 
problems due to its previous policies that were hostile to foreign investors. 
The choice of the very word in the Chinese language, “you hui” 
(preferences) conveyed a positive message. This message was widely 
disseminated and viewed as a key to the success of efforts to promote 
foreign investment.   
                                                 
54 Huang, Yasheng. 2003. The Benefits of FDI in a Transitional Economy: The Case of 
China. in New Horizons for Foreign Direct Investment (Paris: OECD).  
55 For more discussion on these effects, see Caves, Richard E. 1996. Multinational 
Enterprise and economic analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University press); Dunning, 
John. 1988. Investment Incentives throughout Asia. in Explaining International 
Production (London: Unwin Hyman); Dunning, John. 1993. Multinational Enterprises 
and the Global Economy (New York: Addison-Wesley); Janeba, Eckhard. 2002. 
Attracting FDI in a Politically Risky World. 43 (4)  International Economic Review 
1127-55; Porcano, Thomas and Charles E. Price. 1996.  The Effect of Government Tax 
and Nontax Incentives on Foreign Direct Investment. (4) Multinational Business Review 
9-19; Rolfe, Robert J. and Richard A. White. 1992. Investors’ Assessment of the 
Importance of Tax Incentives in Locating Foreign Export-Oriented Investment: An 
Exploratory Study. (14) The J. of the American Taxation Association 39-57; Rondinelli, 
Dennis, and William J. Brupitt. 2000. Do Government Incentives Attract and Retain 
International Investment? A Study of Foreign-Owned Firms in North Carolina. 33 (2) 
Policy Sciences 181-205; and Single, Louise. 1999. Tax Holidays and Firm’s Subsidiary 
Location Desires. 21 (2) The J. of the American Taxation Association 17-34.  
56 This promise was first made in the 1979 Equity Joint Venture Law, which was the first 
piece of legislation governing FDI since the inception of reforms. Just as punitive rates 
under the previous system were the legacy of policies that reflected past hostility toward 
foreign and private capital, in new Equity Joint Venture Law was testament to a 
favourable policy change. 
2007] DEVELOPMENT AND TAX POLICY 21 
 
 
FDI location decisions are influenced by the characteristics of host 
countries, such as endowment of natural resources and labour, level of 
economic development, macroeconomic conditions as well as the 
institutional environment in terms of property rights protection and 
government policy creditability. During the early years of economic 
reforms, China had weak property rights institutions or the system of rule 
of law and relatively low creditability. Therefore, offering generous tax 
preferences arguably compensated China’s weaknesses in this respect.57 
Offering generous tax preferences to foreign investors is also consistent 
with the Chinese hospitality and respects for friendship and personal 
relationships. Tax preferences were presented as gifts or rewards to 
overseas investors.58 The Confucian way of dealing with foreigners was to 
be "generous with gifts without calculating the value of tribute and to 
grant them honours without making heavy demands."59 The Chinese 
believed that by showing generosity and hospitality they could exert moral 
influence on non-Chinese and lead them to "participate in the benefits of 
(Chinese) civilisation."60 The grant of tax preferences is associated with 
the Chinese respect or dependence on relationships (or “guanxi” in 
Chinese) because exchanges of gifts are an important practice in 
establishing and retaining relationships. Whether foreign investors actually 
came to China or even expressed an interest in doing business with the 
country, the Chinese claimed them as friends. Investors could interpret tax 
preferences as reciprocation for their friendly acts of investing in China.61 
This relationship-building effect of tax preferences may have a special 
appeal to overseas Chinese investors. Some of them may have been 
affected by the Communist Party's previous harsh policies and may regard 
                                                 
57 This is consistent with the findings by Li, Quan. 2006. Democracy, Autocracy, and Tax 
Incentives to Foreign Direct Investors: A Cross-National Analysis. 68 (1) The J. of 
Politics 62-74 (more democratic regimes have more creditable rule of law and as a result 
are associated with lower levels of incentives). 
58 Zhaodong Jiang. 1998. China’s Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment: Policy, Culture 
and Modern Concepts. 18 NW. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 549 at 611. 
59 Ibid., at 618. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., at 630. 
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gestures such as granting preferential treatment as implied apologies and 
compensation for past ill-treatment.  Some overseas Chinese have a strong 
attachment to their ancestral land and returned to their native villages and 
hometowns for sentimental as well as business reasons. They felt welcome 
when local government presented them with gifts, including tax 
preferences.62  
The tax preferences presumably played an important role in attracting 
overseas Chinese investors. Much of the Chinese FDI inflow consists of 
capital from three ethnically Chinese economies: Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Macao.63 FDI from these three sources accounted for 59.3 per cent of 
China’s total FDI inflows between 1978 and 1999.64 Ethnic Chinese 
capital suppliers in Asia, North America and other parts of the world also 
contributed to the rapid growth of FDI in China.  
However, these signalling, compensation and hospitality effects wore off 
as China’s investment conditions improve over time. Arguably, China 
does not need to rely on tax preferences to lure investors to China because 
China is now known to have a huge internal market, cheap and disciplined 
labour force, and relatively stable political and legal regime. Meanwhile, 
the tax preferences cause serious distortions to investment for several 
reasons: 
1. As mentioned already, they create unfair tax treatment of domestic 
and foreign enterprises. 
2. They encourage the “wrong” type of investment. The majority of 
tax preferences are granted for “new” investment, they do not 
promote long-term commitment. Foreign investors who are 
                                                 
62 Ibid. This emphasis on building relationships through gift exchanges created some 
problems. Local officials preferred to broad powers in granting tax preferences and to 
outperform other local officials in competing for the investment, resulting in regional tax 
competition and disregard of centrally-made tax policy.  
63 For example, the Ministry of Commerce of China list the top ten origins of FDI in 
China to be Hong Kong, Virgin Islands, Japan, South Korea, United States, Taiwan, 
Cayman Islands, Singapore, Germany and Western Samoa for the first half of 2005.  
64 Huang (1999), supra note 48, at 36. 
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committed to China may create a new entity to benefit from the tax 
preferences instead of investing in an existing enterprise.  
3. To the extent that tax preferences did result in attracting FDI, 
because the lion’s share  FDI is in special areas and regions in 
South-Eastern China, they worsen the problem of regional 
disparities.65   
4. Instead of attracting real “foreign” capital, the generous tax 
preferences encourage Chinese indigenous capital to take an 
international “round trip”66 before investing in China. The round 
tripping distorts data on FDI in China, which may not only 
influence the effectiveness and official management of China's 
FDI utilization, but also bring risks to China’s financial system.67 
The People’s Daily68  reported: 
The British Virgin Islands is a major destination for 
China's offshore investment. … 10,000 out of 
500,000 companies there are from China.  Most 
China-originated money entering tax havens will re-
enter China as "foreign investment," -- "round 
tripping".  … A closer examination of China's star 
foreign direct investment (FDI) figures reveal a large 
amount of capital going out of the country and 
returning under a different guise. The World Bank 
and other experts have estimated the scale of this 
                                                 
65 Chen, Chun (2005) “Reflections on the matter of Foreign Tax Preferences” Int’l 
Taxation in China No.7, 31-33 (in Chinese). 
66 The World Bank and other agencies and experts have estimated that the scale of this 
round tripping could be as high as a quarter of the total FDI inflows into PRC: World 
Bank (2002), Global Development Finance 2002: www.worldbank.org. For more 
discussion, see Xiao, Geng. 2004. Round-T ripping Foreign Direct Investment in the 
People’s Republic of China: Scale, Causes and Implications. 
http://www.adbi.org/discussion-paper/2004/06/01/450.prc.foreign.direct.investment. 
67 Ibid. 
68 “Investment outflows to tax havens” June 22, 2004. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200406/22/eng20040622_147138.html. 
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round tripping could be as large as 20 per cent to 30 
per cent of the total FDI inflow into China, but there 
is no clear definition and detailed estimation method 
behind the numbers. … Even worse is that the trend is 
growing bigger. … The biggest pay-off for recycling 
mainland-originated money through a web of 
companies offshore is the tax concessions that China 
grants to foreign firms.  
5. As one of the largest FDI recipients in the world, China’s 
preferential tax regime for FDI presumably increases the use of tax 
havens, resulting in “harmful” tax competition.69 FDI from well-
known tax havens accounts for the lion’s share of FDI in China.70  
For example, FDI from Virgin Islands is almost twice as much as 
that from the United States; FDI from Samoa (a Pacific island 
country) is about twice as much as FDI from Australia; and more 
FDI from Mauritius than that from South Africa.71 Therefore, 
while the tax preferences may not have increased the total FDI in 
China once the signalling effect, the compensation effect and the 
hospitality effect become less important, there is no doubt that the 
Chinese tax regime influences how FDI is channelled to China.   
                                                 
69 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the implications of the Chinese tax 
regime for the “harmful tax competition” debate.  
70 For a list of origins of FDI, see China Statistical Year Book (2005). 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/html/R1815e.htm. 
71 On August 8, 2006, the Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM"), joined by the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, State 
Administration of Taxation, State Administration for Industry and Commerce, China 
Securities Regulatory Commission ("CSRC") and State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange, amended and released the Provisions for Foreign Investors to Merge and 
Acquire Domestic Enterprises. These include new provisions geared at deterring "false" 
foreign investment. These provisions include: where a PRC entity establishes an offshore 
company for the purpose of acquiring a related domestic company, the post-acquisition 
company will not enjoy FIE treatment unless foreign investors - other than the PRC-
controlled entity - hold 25% or more of the post-acquisition company, or (ii) the offshore 
company invests additional capital accounting for at least 25% of the post-acquisition 
company’s total capital.   
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D. TAX REFORM TOWARDS NEUTRALITY  
The promulgation of the new Uniform Enterprise Income Tax Law72 
signals a shift of Chinese tax policy towards neutrality and fairness. The 
uniform tax rate of 25 percent applies to all enterprises, irrespective of 
their ownership. Tax preferences earmarked for FIEs are to be phased out 
in five years.  Tax incentives are redesigned to subsidize all “high-tech” 
companies and companies that invest in equipment for environmental 
protection and water conservation and production safety.    
Investors and capital markets in China welcome the new tax law as they 
expect the big domestic companies – the major banks, telecom companies, 
oil and gas producers – that dominate indexes of Chinese stocks, will see 
their after-tax earnings boosted by the tax change.73 Chinese tax policy 
makers maintain that the new law will have minimal negative impact on 
attracting FDI to China.74  The overall 25% tax rate is competitive with 
neighbouring countries. The grand-fathering rule for existing foreign-
invested enterprises will help smooth the transition.  
IV. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
A. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT LAGGING 
China’s development goal is to build up a “Xiaokang society” in which 
“people generally are not rich but have adequate food, clothing, and other 
material belongings necessary for a decent life.”75 Economic development 
is a precondition for reaching this goal.76  Amid its rapid economic 
                                                 
72 Supra note 17. 
73 Andrew Batson. 2007. China's Expected New Tax Law would Even the Playing Field.  
The Wall Street Journal (February 26, 2007), at C9. 
74 Xinhua. 2006. China fosters fair competition with unified tax rate. People’s Daily 
Online: http://english.people.com.cn/200612/29/eng20061229_336969.html. 
75 UNDP. 2005. China Human Development Report 2005. http://www.undp.org.cn at 1. 
76 This is not much different from the “Asian path” to development: Pareerboom (2005), 
supra note 8. In 2005, however, the new leadership put forward the concept of scientific 
development and the concept of harmonious society to guide reforms. This was the first 
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growth, China has achieved social development in certain areas. For 
example, according to the United Nations report, China’s human 
development index improved continuously in the past 20 years, from 
0.557 in 1980 to 0.755 in 2003 and China’s global ranking rose from 101st 
in 1991 to 85th in 2003.77 On the other hand, there have been increasing 
income disparities, regional disparities, and urban and rural disparities. For 
example, in 2002, per capita GDP in East China was CNY12,266, but only 
CNY5,144 in Southwest. Within the Southwest region, urban per capita 
GDP was CNY6,304, and rural per capita GDP was only CNY1,744.78 
Women, children, and racial minorities are generally disadvantaged 
disproportionately. Tax policy has not played any significant role in 
promoting social development and in redistribution.   
B. THE TAX MIX AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 
The tax structure in China cannot, by design, play a key role in alleviating 
inequality in income and wealth. In developed countries, the income tax, 
especially the personal income tax, has been used as the main instrument 
for redistributing income.79 In China, the Individual Income Tax’s role of 
redistribution remains largely symbolic at the moment.80 This tax accounts 
                                                                                                                         
time that China took a more comprehensive approach towards development.  Social 
development is elevated to complement economic development. The concept of 
harmonious society stresses the need to reconcile conflicts between rural and urban areas 
and between different social groups to promote social stability. It is linked to the notions 
of social welfare and more equal income distribution and to the rule of law. This new 
comprehensive approach has not been reflected in tax policy. This part of the paper 
examines the relationship between tax policy and social development. See National 
People’s Congress. 2005. Report on the Work of Government Third Session, 10th 
National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 
March 5, 2005. 
77 UNDP (2005), supra note 75, at 7. 
78 Fan and Chan-Kang (2005), supra note 5, at 8. 
79 See Richard M. Bird and Eric M. Zolt (2005). “The Limited Role of the Personal 
Income Tax in Developing Countries” (52) UCLA L. Rev. 1627, at 1627. 
80 This is not much different from the role of personal income tax in other developing 
countries. See Bird and Eric Zolt, ibid.  
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for about 6% of total tax revenue.81 It is progressive only with respect to 
employment income and business income as other types of income are 
taxable at a flat rate. The fraction of population paying the tax grew from 
0.1% of all wage earners in 1986 to 32% of all wage earners in 200182 and 
the average amount of annual tax paid by each wage earner was CNY314 
(less than USD40) in 2002.83 More than one-third of the total IIT on 
employment income was collected from workers at FIEs.84 Given the 
current situations in China, the Individual Income Tax cannot be a 
meaningful tool of redistribution.85    
The VAT and turnover taxes have some progressive features. For 
example, the Consumption Tax is imposed on luxury goods and services at 
progressive rates. This tax is presumably borne by high-income earners.86 
The VAT is slightly progressive with a lower rate on certain necessities 
(e.g., grain and edible oil, running water). Overall however, these taxes 
worsen the urban/rural disparities as low-income rural residents much pay 
                                                 
81 Although still an insignificant source of revenue for the government, the amount of 
revenue increased rapidly: it grew by more than 6 times between 1980 (CNY0.1 million, 
accounting for less than 1% of total tax revenue) and 2004 (CNY173,700 million): see 
State Administration of Taxation, Tax Statistics, published on its website: 
www.chinatax.gov.cn (visited on April 20, 2006). 
82 Thomas Piketty and Nancy Qian.2004. Income Inequality and Progressive Income 
Taxation in China and India, 1986-2001. 
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/macarthur/inequality/papers/PikettyQian2004.pdf at 9-10. 
This fraction is expected to drop as a result of the increased standard deduction to 
CNY1600. See Jinyan Li. 2006. Chinese Individual Income Tax: A 26-Year Old Infant. 
Tax Notes Int’l (July 24, 2006) 297. 
83 Shi, Hua. 2004. Changes in the IIT Revenue Composition. No.4 China Taxation 4-6 (in 
Chinese).  
84 Frontier Tax Policy Study in China (2003), supra note 51, at 344. 
85 Some Chinese scholars argue that progressive taxation cannot achieve distributive 
justice. See, for example, Wang, Chunling and Huang Shumin. 2005. Can Progressive 
Taxation Realize Distributive Justice?  No.10 China Taxation 41 (in Chinese) (the 
authors argue that progressive taxation does not change the inequality in the process of 
distribution of income, provides disincentive to investors and savers, and distorts market 
allocation of resources). 
86 The practice of exchanging gifts in business dealings also means that businesses also 
purchase luxury products as gifts and deduct the cost of the gifts as business expenses.  
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these taxes. In many poor rural areas, these taxes are the only taxes 
collected.87  
The lack of progressivity in the Chinese tax system disproportionately 
disadvantages women and children. In China, women make up a smaller 
proportion of the white-collar workforce than men, and ratio of female-to-
male earnings is about 0.82.88   
C. SOCIAL TAX EXPENDITURES  
Compared with the wide variety of tax preferences for economic 
development, tax expenditures for social development are fewer in number 
and less in amount.89 Most of the tax expenditures under the IIT relate to 
disaster relief, family planning, payments to military personnel, and retired 
cadres. These measures are largely reactive to other policy decisions and 
are not designed to promote any social activities. 
                                                 
87 Tao Ran and Mingxing Liu. 2005. Urban and Rural Household Taxation in China: 
Measurement, Comparison and Policy Implications. (10) No.4 J. of the Asia Pacific 
Economy 486-505. 
88 UNDP (2005), supra note 75, at 43. The regional disparities and shortage of financial 
resources at the local level also have significant adverse impact on women and ethic 
minority groups. Ethnic minority groups generally reside in less developed regions. The 
lack of resources at local level often results in lack of funding for hospitals, schools, 
housing, etc. Thus, local service providers have to charge. Local schools, for example, 
now have to charge what are high fees for peasants. This has led to a dramatic shift in 
education opportunities for women in rural areas. A son is the future “pension plan” for 
his parents; a daughter is someone’s wife and will help support the husband’s parents. 
Thus, in the rural areas and minority areas where the one-child policy is not strictly 
applied, and the daughter is often required to work to pay for the schooling of her brother. 
The results are striking –the ratio of women to men going on to higher education is 
shifting significantly. In rural areas, one study found that girls’ overall enrolment rates 
was about 83%, compared with 92% for boys’ rates. Girls in the bottom household 
income quintile had enrolment rates of 75%. See Emily Hannum, 2003. Poverty and 
Basic Education in Rural China: Villages, Households, and Girls’ and Boys Enrollment. 
(47) No.2 Comparative Education Review 141 at 153. On average, with adult population, 
the illiteracy rate of females is 2.6 times that of males: UNDP (2005), supra note 75, at 
49.  
89 Ma, supra note 41.  
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Arguably, tax expenditures on social development are as important as 
those for economic development during the economic transition. At the 
time of increasing income gaps, the economic reforms smashed the “iron 
rice bowl” style of social security (which was tied to lifetime employment 
at a work unit) when state-owned enterprises were transformed into 
“economically efficient” entities. Redundant workers lost their jobs as 
well as their welfare system (which is typically consisted of subsidized 
housing, medical insurance, and old age pensions).90 The government has 
not introduced any meaningful tax subsidies for housing, education, 
charitable donations, child care, medical care, family support or retirement 
savings. No specific tax expenditure is designed to create jobs or workers 
training or relocation. Although the government has been flirting with the 
idea of tax-subsidized enterprise annuities (or occupational pension plans), 
as discussed below, no concrete tax policy has been enacted. 
Retirement income security is a significant social and political issue in 
China. The Chinese population is aging at an accelerating speed owing to 
three possible factors: the baby-boom in the 1950s and 1960s; the “single-
child per family” policy, resulting in a 4-2-1 family structure featuring 4 
grandparents, two parents, and one child; and the increasing longevity of 
the Chinese people. The percentage of individuals aged 60 and older in the 
Chinese population was 10 percent in 1999 and is expected to be 20.42 
percent in 2030.91  All this means that there will be fewer young people in 
the future to pay taxes that can adequately support the elderly.     
Since the early 1990s, the Chinese government has regarded enterprise 
annuities (employer-sponsored pension plans) as an important pillar in the 
pension system and tax policy as a key instrument for supporting 
enterprise annuities.92  Enterprise annuities are expected to supplement the 
                                                 
90 For an excellent discussion of how state-owned enterprises were both “economic 
entities” and social welfare providers, see Chen. 2002. supra note 14.  
91 By 2030, retirees will account for more than 40% of workers. The Chinese population 
is also aging faster than others. For example, the percentage of retirees (65 years and 
older) of the population grew from 7 to 14 percent in 115 years in France, 66 years in the 
United States, and only 25  years in China.   
92 In 2000, the State Council confirmed that enterprise annuities should take the form of 
defined contribution plans and be managed in accordance with market principles: State 
Council’s Notice on the Plan for the Trial Implementation of Perfecting the Social 
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public pension pillar, which is designed to provide a basic pension of up to 
40 or 45 percent of the average salary at the time of retirement. The capital 
market welcomed the development of enterprise annuities.  It is estimated 
that pension funds in China could exceed US$160 billion by 2030 and 
become the world’s third largest pension market.93  Many enterprises 
created annuities for their workers in order to attract and retain workers in 
an increasingly competitive labour market. The government introduced 
regulatory measures in 200494 to require that all annuities plans be defined 
contribution plans and be managed in accordance with market principles. 
The Ministry of Finance has not enacted any companion tax measures to 
clarify this issue, although a tax deduction was contemplated by the 
government.95 Under the existing tax legislation, contributions made by an 
enterprise into a privately-funded pension plan are generally not 
deductible.96 Borrowing the metaphor from Professor Graetz,97 enterprise 
                                                                                                                         
Insurance System in Cities and Townships”, Guo Fa [2000] No.42. Some local 
governments introduced their own rules to regulate enterprise annuities. By 2004, most of 
the enterprise annuity plans were established by firms in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Dalian and 
other coastal cities that have enjoyed rapid economic growth as well as national 
enterprises in the railway, electricity, petroleum, chemical and financial sectors. The 
annuity funds were managed by local social security administration or the sponsoring 
enterprise. See Jinyan Li. 2005. Enterprise Annuities and Tax Policy in China: Engaged, 
but Not Yet Married. (59) 12 Bulletin for Int’l Fiscal Documentation.  
93 Liu, Yunlong, and Fu, Pingan. 2004. Enterprise Annuity: Model Options and 
International Comparison, at 1 (in Chinese). 
94 MOLSS. Trial Measures on Enterprise Annuities (hereafter “Enterprise Annuity 
Rules”), January 6, 2004, with effect from May 1, 2004. See also, MOLSS. Operating 
Rules governing the Management of Enterprise Annuity Fund. December 31, 2004; 
Standardization of Information Systems for Management of Enterprise Annuity Fund 
Accounts. December 31, 2004; Expert Assessment Rules for Certifying the Status of 
Institutions for Managing Enterprise Annuity Funds. December 31, 2004;  
MOLSS, China Banking Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, and China Insurance Regulatory Commission. Trial Measures on the 
Management of Enterprise Annuity Funds,” February 23, 2004 with effect from May 1, 
2004 (hereafter “Enterprise Annuity Fund Management Rules”).  
95 In a State Council document entitled “Plan for the Trial Implementation of Perfecting 
Social Security System in Cities and Townships” [Guo Fa [2000] No.42.], enterprises 
could deduct up to 4% of total salary. 
96 Some local governments have introduced their own tax measures to allow the 
deduction, ranging from 4 percent to 8 percent, or more of the total salary. For example, 
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annuities and tax policy were engaged to be married for the past fifteen 
years. And yet, the formal marriage has not taken place. 
V. LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 
A. SYSTEM OF RULE-BY-LAW 
China has never had a Western style democracy. The Chinese legal system 
does not contain even the “minimalist content of rule of law”98 – that is, a 
regime under which “the government acts according to the rules produced 
in the political arena and respects the civil rights of its citizens, and that 
there is a judicial party to resort to that embodies the ethic of treating all 
cases before it neutrally and fairly.”99  The current Chinese legal system is 
one of “shehui zhuyi fazhi guojia”,100 or “socialist rule-by-law.” The 
preamble of the Constitution states that China will be guided by 
                                                                                                                         
in Jiangsu Province, a sponsoring employer can deduct an amount of contributions up to 
1.5 month of the salary cost of its employees: Jiangsu State Tax Bureau, and Jiangsu 
Local Tax Bureau, Su Guo Shui Fa [2003] No.147, and Su Di Shui Fa [2003] No.163.  
See also Guangdong Province, “Notice on Establishing Enterprise Annuities in 
Guangdong Province” Yue Fu Ban, [2004] No.81, August 16, 2004 
(http://www.szpf.gov.cn). 
97 Graetz, Michael J. 1987. The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax 
Policies. (135) U. Pa. L. Rev. 851.  
98 For an excellent survey of the notion of “rule of law” in the context of development, 
see Daniels and Trebilcock, supra note 10. For more discussion about whether China has 
rule of law, see Donald C. Clarke. 2003. Puzzling Observations in Chinese Law: When Is 
a Riddle Just a Mistake? in C. Stephen Hsu., ed. 2003. Understanding China’s Legal 
System (NYU Press), at 93-121; Randall Peerenboom  R, ‘Competing Conceptions of the 
Rule of Law in China’ in Peerenboom R, (ed), 2004. Asian Discourses of Rule of Law 
(Routledge, London) at 113-145; Peerenboom. 2002. Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, 
One Hundred Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China’ (3) No.6 Perspectives 7; 
Wang, J. 2004. The rule of law in China: A realistic view of the jurisprudence, the impact 
of the WTO, and the prospects for future development. (2004 December) Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies 347.   
99 Daniels and Trebilcock (2004), supra note 10, at 104. 
100 In 1999 the Constitution was amended to state in article 5: “The People’s Republic of 
China shall practice ruling the country according to law, and shall construct a socialist 
rule-of-law state”. 
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“Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory” and 
that “the Chinese people of all ethic groups will continue to adhere to the 
people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist road”. Article 3 of the 
Constitution requires all state organs (including the court) to apply “the 
principle of democratic centralism.”   
Under the system of rule-by-law, law is made at the top and implemented 
by government agencies. Governmental actions are, in turn, regulated by 
detailed rules. In recent years, Chinese laws and regulations are becoming 
increasingly detailed and transparent. A culture of rule-by-law is taking 
root in the Chinese bureaucracy as it is widely recognized as key to 
maintaining social order and stability.101 The economic transition calls for 
a legal regime that can provide adequate regulation for market players, 
coordinate different kinds of interest, and provide order and predictability 
in human affairs.102  The lack of any precedence in regulating a market 
economy made it necessary for the Chinese government to learn from the 
West. As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, however, the Chinese 
government refused any whole-sale importation of western legal regimes. 
China has adapted western laws to suit Chinese political, social and 
economic conditions. For example, the Chinese tax system and tax rules 
look similar to those in western countries. The major differences between 
the Chinese tax system and western tax systems lie in how the tax 
legislation is made and interpreted.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss whether the lack of rule-of-
law has impeded development in China or whether China’s legal system 
has directly contributed to China’s economic development.103 What 
                                                 
101 Gary H. Jefferson. 1997. China’s Economic Future: A Discussion Paper. (8) no.4 J. of 
Asian Economics 581 at 583. 
102 Albert H.Y. Chen. 1999. Toward a Legal Enlightenment: Discussions in 
Contemporary China on the Rule of Law. (17) no.2 & 3 UCLA Pac. Basin L. J. 125 at 
137. 
103 For a discussion of legal development in other areas, see Clarke, Donald. C., Peter 
Murrell, and Susan Whiting. 2005. The Role of Law in China's Economic Development.  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=878672. In this paper, the authors examine whether law plays an 
important role in three spheres of activity—property rights, agreements to trade, and 
corporate governance. They note that there have been profound changes, with law 
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follows is a discussion of the development of a rule-by-law in the Chinese 
tax system and a normative argument that such development has played a 
positive role in China’s overall legal development.   
B. RULES-BASED TAX SYSTEM 
1. LAW-MAKING 
In China, tax legislation includes tax “laws” (“fa lu”) enacted by the 
National People’s Congress (the legislature),104 “administrative 
regulations” (fa gui) promulgated by the State Council (the government 
branch),105 as well as administrative rules introduced by the State 
Administration of Taxation (SAT), which is a ministry of the State 
Council.106 At present, China has 3 existing tax laws (namely, the 
Individual Income Tax Law, the FIE Tax Law to be replaced by the new 
                                                                                                                         
playing an increasingly important role, and that formal legal institutions have not made a 
critical contribution to China's remarkable economic success.  
104 The National People’s Congress (NPC) is the supreme body under the Chinese 
Constitution. It meets once a year in Beijing. Most of the laws are passed by the Standing 
Committee of the NPC. The NPC often delegates legislative powers to the government 
(i.e., the State Council or ministries of the State Council). This power is exercised 
through the control over its members (the majority of members of NPC and high-ranking 
government bureaucrats are members), as well as through making policy decisions. In 
practice, the Communist Party controls the law-making process as most members of the 
NPC are Communist Party members who are required to follow the party direction.   
105 The State Council is the most powerful organ of state in China. It has power to 
administer and enforce the legislation enacted by the NPC or NPC Standing Committee. 
It is also a legitimate law-making body on its own. Chinese Law-Making Law recognizes 
the force of law of “administrative regulations” by the State Council, as well as 
administrative rules introduced a ministry of State Council, such as the Ministry of 
Finance or State Administration of Taxation. More importantly, because Chinese 
legislation is drafted in broad language and provide broad discretionary powers to the 
administration, the government can often extend or modify the law in practice. 
106 See Law-Making Law of the People’s Republic China, NPC, 2003. In principle, a 
lower-level form of legislation must not deviate from higher-level forms of legislation. In 
practice, many detailed rules of interpretation and application are specified in 
administrative rules or administrative regulations. “Administrative Rules” are documents 
issued by the departments of State Council, including the Ministry of Finance and State 
Administration of Taxation. 
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EIT Law as of January 2008, and the Tax Administration and Collection 
Law107), about 30 administrative tax regulations, about 50 administrative 
rules.108 Court decisions do not have the force of law in China.109 There is 
a long tradition of this style of law-making in China.110 Since the 1980s, 
tax legislation has become more detailed and comprehensive. The trend is 
to elevate “administrative rules” to “administrative regulations” or tax 
laws. 
2. SUBSTANTIVE RULES 
Since 1980, there has been an immense increase in the number of tax laws 
and rules. Each tax law has become more detailed. For example, the new 
uniform Enterprise Income Tax Law has 5422 words, whereas the Join 
Venture Income Tax Law of 1980 had fewer than 2000 words. Each tax 
law is supplemented by a vast body of interpretative rules issued by the 
tax administration.   
                                                 
107This law was first introduced on April 21, 1986 by the State Council in the form of 
provisional regulation. On September 4, 1992, it was upgraded to “law” promulgated by 
the National People’s Congress Standing Committee. Subsequent amendments were 
made on February 28, 1995 and April 28, 2001.   
108 The Taxation Science Research Institute of the State Administration of Taxation of 
China. 2005.  Study on China’s Taxation Legal System (Beijing, China Tax Press) at 3 
(in Chinese).  
109 The Chinese judiciary is very different from its counterpart in Western countries. 
Under the Constitution, the People’s Court is subordinate to the NPC, not independent 
from it. The court has no independent power to interpret legislation.  Most judges are 
party members. Courts at provincial and lower levels are part of the local governments. 
110 There is a long tradition of this style of law-making in China. See William Alford. 
1985. The Limits of “Grand Theory” in Comparative Law. (61) Wash. L. Rev. 945; 
Daniel Chow. 2003. The Legal Systems of the People’s Republic of China, (Thompson 
West), ch.2; Thomas Stephens. 1992. Order and Discipline in China (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press); William C. Jones. 2003. Trying to Understand the Current Chinese 
Legal System. In Hsu, C. Stephen, ed., Understanding China's legal system: essays in 
honor of Jerome A. Cohen (New York : New York University Press), 7-45; Graham 
Mayeda. 2005. A Normative Perspective on Legal Harmonization: China’s Accession to 
the WTO.  (38) U.B.C. Law Rev. 83; and Xin Ren. 1997. Tradition of the Law and Law 
of the Tradition (Greenwood Press).   
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These tax rules provide an increasing degree of certainty to taxpayers with 
respect to the determination of their tax liability. Overall, the tax system is 
more and more based on relatively precise legal rules as opposed to open-
ended standards or administrative discretions.  
3.  TAX PROCEDURES AND ADMINISTRATION  
The SAT is responsible for administering tax laws in China. Instead of 
being part of the Ministry of Finance, the SAT is a separate department 
under the State Council. Its national head-office is in Beijing and local 
offices located across the country. Local tax bureaus were established to 
collect local taxes and some taxes shared between the national and local 
government. Local tax bureaus are part of local government, but under the 
supervision of the SAT in terms of tax law interpretation and policy.  As 
of 2005, there were over 747,200 individuals officially employed by the 
SAT and local tax bureaus.111 
The tax administration is increasingly governed by rules and procedures. 
Tax collection and administration had been governed by administrative 
regulations until 1991 when The Tax Administration and Collection Law 
(TACL) was promulgated. The TACL contains 94 articles and modernizes 
the current collection system, sets clear standards on the collection of 
taxes at both the state and the local level, and sets penalties for various 
violations of the law. It also provides the framework to allow the tax 
authorities more access to taxpayer information and to better define the 
rights and responsibilities of both tax officers and taxpayers. The 
Implementation Rules for the TACL112 contain 113 articles, providing 
detailed implementation guidance for the supervision and administration 
of tax collection in China. The TACL and the Implementation Rules have 
                                                 
111 SAT website, www.chinatax.gov.cn (visited June 18, 2007). 
112 Implementation Rules for the Tax Administration and Collection Law were enacted by 
the State Council on August 4, 1993, amended in 2002 to take effect on October 15 of 
that year. For an overview of the Implementation Rules for the TACL, see Daniel K.C. 
Cheung. 2002. Implementing Rules for Levying And Collecting Taxes In China. 28 Tax 
Notes Int'l 1141 (Dec. 16, 2002). 
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been accredited not only as a “breakthrough in China's tax administration 
system, but a first in the history of China's legal system”.113   
In addition to TACL, there are rules governing invoice management,  tax 
administrative reviews, tax audit, internal inspection, assessment of tax 
penalties, and tax litigation. The tax administration has also achieved 
remarkable progress in services, transparency and respect of taxpayers’ 
rights.  
At the beginning of economic transitions, the direct assessment system 
was necessary as taxpayers were unfamiliar with tax laws. With the 
deepening of the transition, direct assessment was gradually replaced by 
taxpayer reporting. By 1997, a three-part administration system was 
established: filing of returns by taxpayers coupled with taxpayer services, 
utilization of information technology, and centralization of tax collection 
and targeted tax audit and inspections. Taxpayers file tax returns at tax 
service centers. Tax collectors are no longer directly involved in 
establishing a taxpayer’s tax liability. There are less “face-to-face” contact 
between taxpayers and tax officials who assess their tax liabilities, and 
thus fewer opportunities for dishonest taxpayers and tax collectors to 
collude in cheating on the tax system. Taxpayer services have been 
improving. Tax officials are required to “smile at taxpayers” or just “be 
nice and polite to taxpayers by putting themselves in the shoes of 
taxpayers.”114 The move to self-assessment has been accompanied by 
computerization and information technologies. Opportunities for 
corruption have been reduced greatly after the computerization of taxpayer 
records and initial selection of targets for audit.  
The level of transparency in the tax administration improved greatly over 
the years.  During the early years of reform, many tax documents were 
labelled as “confidential”, out of reach to taxpayers. Now, the SAT 
publishes tax legislation, interpretation documents, rulings, and other 
                                                 
113 Ibid., at 1145. 
114 Shenzhen Local Tax Bureau. 1996. Strengthening the Service Function and 
Establishing Modern Tax Administration System in the Sepcial Economic Zone. 
Zhongguo Shuiwu, 1996, No.10, 5; Zhang Zilu, Guo Fengxiao, Liu Xiaoqing. 1996. 
Open a New Sky and Land. No. 7 Zhongguo Shuiwu, 15-19 (in Chinese). 
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types of information on its website115 or in print form through the China 
Taxation Press.116 The SAT is also developing an advance ruling system, 
especially in the area of transfer pricing. The process of negotiating 
advance pricing agreements is governed by "Implementation Rules for 
Advance Pricing Agreements governing Transactions between Associated 
Enterprises (Trial)".117  
Taxpayers’ rights are specified in the TACL Law and Implementation 
Rules.118 Taxpayers (and withholding agents) have the following rights: to 
request that the tax authorities treat the information provided as 
confidential; to apply for tax reductions,  exemptions, and refunds 
according to the relevant tax laws;  to make a statement or to defend 
themselves against the decision of the tax office; to resort to the process of 
administrative and judicial review and to request compensation for 
damages incurred; and to use and disclose illegal activities conducted by 
the tax authorities and  tax officials.119 In addition, taxpayers have the 
right to deny a tax inspection if tax officials fail to present a tax inspection 
                                                 
115 http://www.chinatax.gov.cn. 
116 Publications includes books, loose-leaf, 6-volume Tax Laws and Regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China, tax journals such as China Taxation, and Taxation Research, 
and news bulletins. 
117 Guo Shui Fa (2004) 118, 3 September 2004. Because the APA program is modelled 
on that recommended by the OECD and used in the United States, Canada and other 
OECD countries, the Chinese APA program is largely similar to that in OECD countries. 
For a discussion of the Chinese APAs, see IBFD. The International Guide to Transfer 
Pricing (loose-leaf) (chapter on China written by Jinyan Li) (Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands) (last update 2007).  
118 The TACL also set forth taxpayers obligations. For example, taxpayers must complete 
tax registration. Without proper tax registration, taxpayers cannot open any bank 
accounts, apply for tax refunds or exemptions, or engage in tax matters relating to 
business cessation, business suspension, and the like. Taxpayers must keep proper books, 
vouchers, invoices, tax payment records, and other tax related information for at least 10 
years. Taxpayers much install and use tax control equipment (such as computers with 
approved software). See TACL Implementation Rules, Articles 18, 28 and 29. 
119 TACL, Art.8. 
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certificate and tax inspection notice120 and to request an extension to file 
returns and to make tax payments.121 
Tax officials are required by the TACL to be independent and impartial in 
enforcing tax laws, to act with integrity and courtesy, to respect and 
protect the rights of taxpayers and withholding agents, and to avoid 
conflicts of interest when carrying out collection or investigation. If 
taxpayers’ rights are unlawfully infringed or violated, taxpayers can sue 
for damages. Tax officials may be sued for inappropriate conduct, such as 
the withholding or seizing of taxpayers' accommodation (such as 
residential property), daily living necessities in enforcing tax collections, 
or abuse of power.122 There are penalties on tax officials who show 
favouritism, commit malpractice, or fail to report criminal acts to law 
authorities or retaliate against taxpayers for reporting tax officials’ wrong-
doing  as well as those who intentionally delay, advance, or allocate 
revenue quota or who wrongfully collect taxes.  
There is a growing profession of tax practitioners to assist taxpayers in tax 
planning, compliance, and dispute resolution. At present, tax practice is 
dominated by accountants; on average, 30 percent of revenue of 
accounting firms is from tax work.123 Lawyers are engaged in tax practice, 
but on a much smaller scale.124 There are also over 62,000 certified tax 
agents, including 20,000 active practitioners125 who assist taxpayers with 
                                                 
120 TACL, Art. 59; TACL Implementation Rules, Art.89. 
121 TACL, Arts. 27, 31 and TACL Implementation Rules, art. 37. 
122 TACL, Art. 43. 
123 Study on Chinese Taxation Legal System (Beijing, China, 2005), supra note 108, at 
394. 
124 Chow, supra note 109, at 229. For a discussion of the Chinese legal profession and 
legal education, see Wang, Weifang. 2005. China's Legal Profession: The Nascence And 
Growing Pains Of A Professionalized Legal Class. 19 Colum. J. Asian L 138; and Zeng, 
Xianyi. 2002. Legal Education in China. 43 S. Tex. L. Rev. 707.  
125 See Xinhua, China Has 62,000 Certified Tax Agents. available 
http://www.chinadaily.com (2005-02-22 16:21). These agents are regulated by Trial 
Measures on Tax Agents issued by the SAT in September 1994 and Trial Rules 
Governing the Practice of Tax Agents issued by the SAT in October 2001.  
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compliance, dispute resolution, and other dealings with the tax 
administration.  
4. THE COURT   
Under the Chinese Constitution, the judiciary is under the leadership of the 
National People’s Congress. The courts have no independent power of 
interpretation of the law.126 There is no common-law tradition in China 
and judicial decisions do not form part of “law” in China. Judges are 
government officials in terms of salary, ranking, and appointment.  
In the tax area, until recently, the courts played virtually no role. At 
present, the court’s role is largely limited to adjudicating “administrative 
cases” and criminal cases. Administrative tax cases involve taxpayers 
bringing a law suit against a tax official or agency for “misconducts” in 
accordance with the Administrative Procedures Law.127 These conducts 
are generally related to actions in assessing penalties, enforcing 
collections, or other aspects of tax administration. Criminal cases involve 
tax payers and tax officials being prosecuted for tax fraud, evasion and 
other crimes.  
The kinds of tax disputes dealt with by the tax court in countries such as 
Canada are rarely within the jurisdiction of Chinese courts. Disputes 
between taxpayers and the tax administration arising from the 
interpretation of tax legislation are mostly resolved through administrative 
                                                 
126 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the factors that hinder the development 
of judicial independence. For more discussion, see Peerenboom (2002), “The 
Judiciary: In Search of Independence, Authority and Competence” in 
China’s Long March Towards Rule of Law, supra note 8, Ch.7.  
127 The Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted on 
April 4, 1989 at the Second Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress. The SAT 
has issued guidelines to help local tax offices prepare for the defense, make arguments in 
court, file appeals, and enforce court decisions. See Operational Guidelines on 
Responding to Tax Administrative Appeals (effective on January 1, 1995). See also 
Decision of the SAT on Several Questions Concerning Establishing Displinary and 
Inspection Offices, Zhongguo Shuiwu Bao, November 15, 1995. 
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reviews.128 The judiciary’s role is very limited for several reasons. First, 
the courts do not have the final power of interpretation. The law-maker is 
also the interpreter in China.129 As such, the legislature, the State Council, 
or even the SAT has the power to interpret the meaning of tax 
legislation.130 It is largely pointless for tax payers to challenge the SAT’s 
interpretation in a court. Moreover, Chinese tax law is largely 
administrative law. The SAT has de facto power to draft tax legislation, 
interpret it, and enforce it. Most Chinese taxes are governed by regulations 
or rules introduced by the State Council or the SAT. The SAT has the 
power of interpretation in most cases.  Even with tax laws enacted by the 
NPC, the legislation is generally worded, leaving the tax administration 
with broad powers of interpretation. For example, with respect to 
entitlement to tax preferences, tax law generally requires taxpayers to 
apply to the tax administration for “approval” before they can enjoy the 
preferences. Finally, tax expertise is concentrated in the tax 
administration. Tax officials are presumed to know tax laws better than 
anyone else (taxpayers, judges, and members of the Legislature). The 
small number of tax cases makes it difficult for judges to develop tax 
expertise. There is a lack of institutional competence on the part of the 
judiciary to deal with tax law interpretation.  Establishing a national 
                                                 
128 Yao Meiyan and Hao Ruyu, at 663-669. See Study on Chinese Taxation Legal System 
(2005), supra note 108, at 277. Judicial appeals on matters of interpretation are virtually 
non-existent in China: Study on Chinese Taxation Legal System (2005), supra note 108, 
at 275. 
129 This principle is consistent with the rule-by-man tradition in imperial China and the 
current “people's democratic dictatorship” model of governance endorsed by the Chinese 
constitution. 
130 The power of interpreting tax law is, in theory, shared among the legislature, the court, 
and the tax administration.  In the case of statutes enacted by the legislature, the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress  has the sole power to interpret “laws”. The 
Supreme People’s Court  has the power to interpret the taxing statutes for the purposes of 
adjudicating cases. In practice, the Supreme Court has not heard any tax cases, so it has 
never rendered any interpretation. In tax evasion or tax fraud cases that involve the death 
penalty, the Supreme Court may be involved. In other case, courts of the second instance, 
usually the intermediate courts, render final decisions.  
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travelling tax court131 would be helpful to the development of tax expertise 
in the judiciary, but such idea is unlikely implemented in the near future. 
C. TAX-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT TOWARD RULE OF LAW  
Overall, compared to other areas of law in China, tax law is arguably the 
most sophisticated in terms of legislative drafting and administration.  
This is largely due to the importance of taxation to the government.  
As explained earlier, China’s primary tax policy objectives are revenue, 
efficiency and international competitiveness. Establishing a system of 
taxation based on clear rules is important to achieving these objectives 
because tax rules are written not only to govern the relationship between 
taxpayers and the government, but also the relationship between the SAT 
and local tax offices and the relationship between the tax administration 
and other government departments.  
In terms of promotion of economic development, predictable and clear tax 
rules are undoubtedly important. Taxpayers need these rules to arrange 
their affairs or decide whether to invest in China. One of the reasons 
behind the dual-track enterprise income tax system was to create a tax 
system that is perceived to be predicable and fair by international 
investors. As discussed already, the dual-track system is highly 
discriminative now, but its original rationale was sound in the 1980s. 
China has always been sensitive to its international image and creating a 
rule-based system is considered to an important part of projecting a 
positive image.  This sensitivity helps explain why the foreign track of the 
tax system (i.e., the Individual Income Tax and the FIE Tax) is regulated 
by taxing statutes enacted by the NPC. 
In order to secure revenue, the SAT has worked hard to introduce rules to 
clarify the obligations and rights of taxpayers (discussed above) as well as 
those of local tax offices, other government agencies. The head-office of 
the SAT does not actually collect any taxes, the SAT requires clear tax 
                                                 
131 See, Xu, Shanda. 2003. Research on China’s Taxing Powers (Beijing, China Tax 
Press). Mr. Xu is currently deputy commission of SAT. He used to be the head of the 
department of tax policy and tax legislation at the SAT. 
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rules to guide and monitor the work of local offices. Clear rules also 
enable the SAT to fence off the interference of local governments with tax 
collection.  In principle, “national” taxes are collected by the local offices 
of the SAT, and local taxes are collected by local tax bureaus. For 
example, income tax owed by state-owned enterprises under the control of 
the Central Government is collected by the SAT, while other types of 
domestic enterprises pay tax to the local tax bureaus. Under the previous 
central planning model, enterprises were managed by different level of 
governments. This legacy is continued into the current tax system.  Since 
there is only a weak supervisory role of the SAT and there is no effective 
system for distributing and enforcing common policy, the SAT sometimes 
has to rely on more clear and authoritative legislative rules to carry out its 
policies.    
In order to ensure productive cooperation between the SAT and other 
government departments (such as the police, the People’s Bank, and the 
courts), the TACL specifically provide the obligations of these agencies in 
enforcement. In the absence of legislative rules, departmental conflicts or 
non-cooperation could be a serious problem. The lack of support from the 
police has been a main reason for the SAT to request a special “tax police” 
force. In order to regulate departmental relations, the rules must come 
from a superior body – the State Council or the NPC. That is why the 
TACL is one of three pieces of taxing statues enacted by the NPC.  
A relatively sophisticated rules-based tax system might become a driving 
force towards the rule of law in China. Like taxpayers elsewhere, Chinese 
taxpayers will demand more protection of their private wealth132 and 
demand more certainty and predictability in their tax relationship with the 
government. The government will need to rely on more precise rules to 
improve governance in tax administration.  
                                                 
132The recognition and protection of “private property” has been affirmed by the newly-
promulgated Property Law – Property Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
promulgated on March 16, 2007 by the fifth session of the tenth People’s Congress. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analyzes the role of tax policy in China’s development. It 
concludes that tax policy has played an important, but somewhat mixed 
role in economic development. The current tax structure, emphasizing 
consumption taxation, is easier to administer and a reliable source of 
revenue. Tax incentives played an important role during the earlier years 
of economic development by helping attract FDI to China and 
restructuring domestic enterprises. In recent years, however, the negative 
impact of the tax incentives and the discriminative policy against domestic 
enterprises has become more serious.  As an instrument of social 
development, tax policy has not been used much in China. Redistribution 
of income is minimal. Social spending through tax expenditures is 
insignificant. The relationship between legal development and tax policy 
is perhaps not as obvious. The paper argues that there has been significant 
development towards a tax system ruled by law. While the legislature and 
the judiciary play a limited (although gradually increasing) role in the tax 
system, the power of making, interpreting and enforcing tax rules largely 
remains with the tax administration. The Chinese tax administration has 
become more efficient, professional and transparent and recognizes a wide 
range of taxpayers’ rights.   
It is clear that tax reform has been an important part of legal reform in 
China, which in turn is an important part of China’s development process. 
These reforms have aimed at creating substantive and procedurally 
efficient rules as opposed to creating a rule of law system, featuring an 
independent judiciary or an extensive system of civil liberties.133 The best 
tax policy is one that suits local conditions. Chinese tax policy is largely 
“home-grown”, although international influences are important. During 
the early years, Chinese officials and scholars translated and studied 
foreign tax materials and learned from international tax experts. Through 
treaty negotiations, tax officials learned the fundamental rules of 
international taxation from their counterparts. International institutions, 
                                                 
133 It is a paraphrase of Posner, ibid. at 9: “Legal reform is an important part of the 
modernization process of poor countries, but the focus of such reform should be on 
creating substantive and procedurally efficient rules of contract and property rather than 
on creating a first-class judiciary or an extensive system of civil liberties.” 
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such as the IMF, OECD and World Bank, provided technical tax advice 
and training. The Chinese have insisted on “using foreign stuff to meet 
Chinese needs.” VAT is good, but only production-type VAT is suitable to 
China. So, China opted for the not-so-good type of VAT.  Self-assessment 
system is theoretically good, but impractical for China. So, the IIT is 
collected monthly through source withholding. China has not limited itself 
to learning from any particular regime of western laws (i.e., common-law 
or civil law).  
Development is a universal issue, but the path to development may be 
country-specific. The Chinese model of development may be quite unique. 
The approach to development is “gradual” and pragmatic, not the “big 
bang” model adopted in other transitional economies. The style of 
governance is top-down – the government has a huge role in economic 
development. Ultimately, everything is political – all reforms have taken 
place within the confines of “socialism” and the leadership role of the 
Communist Party. This model of development defines the particular model 
of tax policy in China.   
 
 
